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VIOLATION OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE AS
NEGLIGENCE PER SE IN KENTUCKY
DONALD

IKiEPNEir*

While in a number of jurisdictions an infraction of a statute
or ordinance is considered to be only evidence of negligence,'
the prevailing rule is that an unexcused violation is negligence as
a matter of law The cases in Kentucky are in accord with the
latter holding and are in substantial agreement with the rule
approved by the American Law Institute. 2 Under this view a
violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se if the
enactment is designed to protect members of a class from a par
ticular hazard, 3 if the person injured belongs to the class protected, and the injury is the type that the statute is designed to
protect.4 The violation complained of must be the proximate
cause of the injury, 5 and the injured party is required to be
free of contributory negligence. 6
A failure to properly determine the above limitations frequently leads to fruitless litigation, aptly demonstrated m the
case of L. & N By. Co. v Sloan.- In an action against the railroad, the plaintiff, alleging that he was injured when a cinder
from a locomotive blew into his eye, claimed that the defendant
was guilty of negligence per se in not having a spark arrester
on its engine as required by statute. Affirming a judgment for
the defendant, the Court of Appeals noted that the purpose of
the legislature in enacting the statute in question was to eliminate
the hazard of fire to adjoining property caused by large cinders
escaping from smokestacks of engines. The court reasoned that
if the spark arrester had been functioning the chance of harm
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.S., University of Illinois; J.D., Emory University
'PROSSER, TORTS 275 (1941).
Restatement, Torts sec. 286 (1934)
'Wigginton & Sweeney v. Bruce, 174 Ky 691, 192 S.W 850
(1917) Sutton's Adm'r v. Wood, 120 Ky. 23, 85 S.W 201 (1905).
'Hackney v Fordson Coal Co., 230 Ky 362, 19 S.W 2d 989
(1929).
Brown Hotel v. Levitt, 306 Ky. 804, 209 S.W 2d 70 (1948),
Phillips v. Scott, 254 Ky. 340, 71 S.W 2d 662 (1934), Conway v L. &
N. Ry. Co., 135 Ky 229, 119 S.W 206 (1909)
Murphy v Homans, 286 Ky 191, 150 S.W 2d 14 (1940).
287 Ky 663, 155 S.W 2d 231 (1941).

VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE

to the plaintiff would have been increased rather than diminished, since the arrester breaks large cinders into particles small
enough to enter the eye. The court concluded that the violation
of the statute was not the proximate cause of the injury It may
be observed that the plaintiff was not a member of the protected
class, nor was the injury of the type the statute was designed to
prevent.

While it has been urged that there was no basis in the
Common Law for giving civil remedies to private persons for
injuries sustained through another's violation of a public- statute, s no such uncertainty exists in Kentucky, for the doctrine
of negligence per se has been given legislative approval. The
appropriate section of the Revised Statutes reads as follows, "A
person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from
the offender such damage as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation. ' 'I

Construmg the foregoing section, the Court of Appeals in
Hackney v Fordson Coal Co., ° declared "Section 466 of the
-statutes was passed to remove any doubt that might arise as to
the right of a person for whose protection a statute was passed,
to recover for a violation of that statute, where the statute was
penal in nature, or where by its terms the statute did not prescribe the remedy for its enforcement."l
The legislature in enacting safety and welfare measures
frequently establishes a standard of conduct in addition to that
imposed by the Common Law, and a breach of the legislative
standard will be a violation to the rights of those it was intended
to protect. On the other hand the statutory duty is not exclusive,
in that the actor must also exercise due care as defined by the
Common Law i2 One injured by another's infraction of a statute
may recover damages, although the statute itself imposed no
3
penalty for the violatmon.i
It must be remembered that many statutes are passed for
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1 at 265.
'Ky. R. S. sec. 446.070
(1948)
10230 Ky. 362, 19 S.W 2d 989 (1929)'"Andricus Adm'r v Pineville Coal Co., 121 Ky 724, 90 S.W 233
(1906).
"Prichard-v Collins, 228 Ky. 635, 15 S.W 2d 497 (1929)
"L. & N. Ry Co. v. Cooper, 164 Ky 489, 175 S.W 1034 (1915)
L.J.-2
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the benefit of the public generally rather than for the protection
of a particular class, and the infraction of such legislation does
not give rise to a statutory cause of action in favor of those
injured. Representative statutes of this type are those requiring
drivers of automobiles to have licenses, 14 legislation prohibiting
specified activities on Sunday,iO ordinances requiring property
owners to clear sidewalks abutting their property, 16 and enactments forbidding parking in specified areas.1 7 Numerically
speaking, the majority of infractions of municipal laws result
only in the creation of a public nuisance, since as a rule, ordinances regulate objectionable conduct primarily for the protection of all the public.
Although the recent cases decided by the Court of Appeals
make no distinction between statutes and ordinances,'$ the idea
is prevalent among some practicing lawyers, that a violation of
an ordinance is never negligence as a matter of law. Probably
the cause primarily responsible for this misconception, is a failure
to distinguish between ordinances enacted for the benefit of the
municipality and all its inhabitants, such as were described in
the preceding paragraph, and those designed to protect specified
groups. Another source of misunderstanding is to be found in
misinterpreting the cases 0 that have held that a violation of a
city ordinance does not give the party injured a right of action
under section 446.070 of the Revised Statutes. A careful reading
of these cases reveals that they hold only that section 446.070
does not apply to ordinances, and they do not purport to decide
the question of whether or not an ordinance, independent of the
14 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1 at 266.
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS sec. 287, illustration 2. (1934).
0

"RESTATEMENT, TORTS sec. 288, comment a. (1934)

" One of the members of the Louisville Bar advises that a trial
judge gave peremptory instructions for the defendant, another motorist, in a suit for injuries to the plaintiff's car, on the theory that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in parking
too near a fire plug. The local bar for some time referred to the unfortunate attorney who, because of the amount involved had not
appealed, as "Fireplug
"
" Greyhound Terminal of Louisville v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44, 209
S.W 2d 478 (1948), Brown Hotel Co. v. Levitt, 306 Ky.. 801, 209- SNT
2d 70- (1948).
"Equitable Life Assurance Society v McClellan, 286 Ky 17, 149
S.W 2d 730 (1941) Baker v White, 251 Ky 691, 65 S.W 2d 1022
(1933).
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statute, creates a duty to private citizens, giving rise to a cause
of action if the duty is breached.
The third factor that may be responsible for the erroneous
idea relating to fixed standards of conduct established by
municipal legislative bodies, may be reliance on a line of cases
beginning in 1876, which has never been expressly overruled,
and which held that a violation of a city ordinance was neither
negligence nor evidence of negligence. The initial case, Dofinger
v _ishbaek 20 arose from an infraction of an ordinance making
it unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to be more than ten feet
from his horse or other animal while it was harnessed to a vehicle
in the street. The defendant driver while delivering parcels for
is employer, was faced with the dilemma of disobeying the
ordinance above stated, or breaking an ordinance which prohibited the hitching of horses to shade trees. Choosing the former
course, the driver left the horse in the street unattended, however,
taking the precaution of detaching one trace from the single tree.
For some unknown reason dobbin took fright, ran away, and
collided with the plaintiff's wagon, injuring the plaintiff's person and property During the trial the plaintiff read in evidence
the ordinance violated by the defendant. The Court of Appeals
found this to be a prejudicial error and reversed a judgment
entered for the plaintiff. The court declared.
"The general council of the city has no general
power of legislation. It no doubt had power to pass the
ordinance and enforce it as a mere police regulation, but
further than that it had no power. It may be dangerous
for a driver to leave his team upon the street and the
city council no doubt has authority to prohibit such an
act; but the simple fact that they did prohibit it does not
tend to prove that the appellant's driver was guilty of such
negligence as render them liable for an m3ury resulting
from their team having been left
standing upon the streets
in violation of the ordinance."'
The Dolfinger litigation was followed by a series of suits involving injuries inflicted on railroad crossings by trains operated
in excess of a speed limit imposed by a municipality 22 In each
of these cases the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that
-75 Bush (Ky.) 475 (1876)
Id. at 480.
-Ward's Adm'r v. I. C. C. Ry. Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep: 191, 56 S.W
807 (1900)-; L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dalton, 102 Ky 290, 43 S.W 431
(1897), E. L. & B. S. Ry. v Beam, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 682, 11 S.W 6
(1888)
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violation of the ordinance by the defendant railroad was negligence per se. Typical language is found in Loznsville & Nashville
R. B. Co. v Redmon's Adrnx., in which the court stated. "While
there is a conflict of authority as to the effect of municipal ordinances in cases of this character the rule is well settled in this
state that such ordinances are not admissible, and that running
in violation of them is not negligence.' 23
The last of the so-called railroad cases, Ford's Admr v.
Paducah City Railroad,24 decided in 1907, involved a street railway This litigation ensued as a result of a street car running
into a pedestrian. The accident occurred while the defendant
company was operating their car in the business district in the
city of Paducah at a rate exceeding the maximum lawful speed
in that area. Appealing from a judgment entered against him,
the plaintiff asserted that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in refusing to, admit the ordinance in evidence. The appellate court, observing that the appellant had cited cases from
other jurisdictions in support of his contention, noted that the
brief cited no Kentucky authorities in support of his position.
The court declared. "On the contrary it has been repeatedly
held that the violation of a city ordinance m this respect is of
itself, no evidence of negligence.
The violation of a city
ordinance is no more evidence of negligence than obedience to its
provisions would be evidence of due care. "2
While Dolfinger v Fishback and the railroad cases were
never expressly overruled, they have been overruled by implication. This was not accomplished in a single case but by a number
of cases which, step by step, established a principle of law contrary to that'approved in the earlier cases. The first step in this
process came about as a result of cases in which the plaintiff's
injuries arose from the defendant's simultaneous violation of
both a statute and an ordinance containing similar but not
identical regulations. The leading case was Midlins v Nordlaw,2 6
which reached the Court of Appeals in 1916. The plaintiff had
recovered a judgment for injuries sustained in a fire in the defendant's tenement house. While the plaintiff alleged negligence
122 Ky. 385, 91 S.W 722 (1906).
124 Ky 488, 30 Ky L. Rep. 644, 99 S.W 355 (1907)
Ibzd.
" 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W 825 (1916)
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per se both in the defendant's violation of the Tenement House
Act of 1910, and in the infraction of an ordinance requiring fire
escapes on certain types of buildings in the City of Louisville,
the trial court decided the ease on the theory that the defend:ant's liability should rest upon the violation of the ordinance
rather than the statute. The trial court's theory was adopted and
the judgment affrmed by the reviewing court in a well considered
opiion.

Two years later the Court of Appeals in Louisville Trust Co.
v Morgan's Admr.,2 7 affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff in
litigation arising from similar circumstances. The plaintiff's
testate lost his life in the disastrous Seventh Avenue Hotel fire of
1915. The hotel did not have either the fire extinguishers and
hose required of such buildings by the statutes, or the outside fire
escapes by an ordinance of the City of Louisville. The defendant
after unsuccessfully challenging the validity of thje statute and
ordinance upon which the plaintiff had based his case, claimed
that the violation of the ordinance and the statute was not the
proximate cause of the death, for the fire had spread so rapidly
that the plaintiff's testate could not have used the safety equipment had it been available. Answering the argument the Court
declared.
"Proceeding now with the argument a little
further, the effect of it is that if guests in a hotel are put
in a room from which escape in case of fire, would be extremely difficult if not wholly impractical, there should
be no recovery on account of the want of safety equipment because if the equipment had been supplied the

guests could not avail themselves of its protection. To so
construe the statute and ordinance would be to destroy
the very purpose of their enactment, and to give them a
meaning that would enable owners and lessees of fire
traps, like the Seventh Avenue Hotel, to escape liability
upon the grounds that the rooms and the halls were so
located and situated so that guests could not avail themselves of fire escapes and other safety equipment if they
had been provided. Of course, we cannot agree that the
useful provisions of the statute and ordinance
should be
made worthless by such a construction."' 9
It was, however, the Mullins case that has paved the way
for the result reached in Adams Brothers v Clark,29 which was
decided in 1920. This suit arose from a violation of an ordinance
180 Ky. 609, 203 S.W 555 (1918).
SId. at 623
189 Ky. 279, 224 S.W 1046 (1920).

364:

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

prohibiting fowls from running at large within the corporate
limits of the town of Smithland, the ordinance providing that
violators were to be fined not less than one dollar nor more than
five dollars for each offense. The defendant's chickens, kept
within the corporate limits, had discrinmmately invaded the
premises occupied by the plaintiff feed dealer, and had destroyed
approximately $500 worth of feed. A judgment entered for the
defendant by the trial court was reversed on appeal. The Court
of Appeals observed
"It is the contention of appellants that since by
the ordinance quoted above it is unlawful for appellee to
allow her chickens to run at large it was negligence per se
to allow them to range on appellant's lot and eat the food
in their barn. This court has held in cases where an ordinance was violated no recovery in damages would be had
merely for the violation of the city law, if there was in
fact no negligence. These cases arose out of ordinances
fixing the rate of speed for trams at street crossings and
upon public thoroughfares."'
Among the "railroad" cases cited, but not discussed by the
court were Dolfinger v. Fishback and Ford's Adrnr v. Padiucah
City Railway. The Dolfinger case, as was pointed out in a prior
paragraph, actually involved an ordinance similar in many
respects to the one involved in the case under consideration, and
had no relation to railroads, while in the Ford case the ordinance
in question was undoubtedly passed as a safety measure to protect pedestrians and vehicular traffic from the hazard of injury
from speeding street cars. Through inadvertence the court did
not discuss the two decisions that were squarely opposed to the
decision reached in the case at bar. The other railroad cases
were distinguishable in that the ordinances involved in those
cases were enacted for the benefit of the public generally Steam
engines pulling trams through towns and villages at excessive
speeds frightened animals, increased the amount of smoke emitting from puffing engines, accelerated the vibration of structures
adjacent to the tracks, and were as undesirable as the increased
chance of harm to parties using public crossings. All were evils
to be remedied by the ordinances regulating the speed of trams.
The Adams Brothers case, it is to be noted, was the first case in
which a violation of a city ordinance was held to be negligence
' 189 Ky 279, 285, 224 S.W 1046, 1049 (1920)
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per se, where the defendant had not also violated a statute prohibiting the conduct causing the injury
In Home Laundry v Cook 31 the Court of Appeals held that
a reverse turn made by a motorist on a boulevard in violation
of a city ordinance was negligence per se, the jury having found
that the defendant's violation of the ordinance was the proxnate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This was followed by Murphy v
Hozans 3. 2 which involved the defendant's violation of a statute
regulating the rate of speed for automobiles in specified areas,
and the plaintiff's violation of an ordinance forbidding jaywalking. The Appellate Court sent the case back for a new trial instructing the trial court to charge the jury that if the plaintiff's
violation of the ordinance prohibiting pedestrians from crossing
streets except at specified places, was the proximate cause of the
injury their verdict should be for the defendant.
Drhzam v. Maralta33 arose from an injury sustained by the
plaintiff, a tenant in defendant's apartment house, while descending unlighted stairs. It was alleged that the defendant violated
both a statute and an ordinance, each of which required the
defendant landlord to keep the light burning in the hallway at
the time the injury in question occurred. Citing Ruling Case
Law,3 4 the court declared "If the injury complained of is one
which was intended to be prevented by the statute and ordinance,
supra, the violation of their provisions must be considered as the
proximate cause of the injury ,,3r The court concluded "There
can be no question that the Statute and the Ordinances above
quoted were intended to prevent a person using the steps in an
apartment house from falling in the darkness." 3
Judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed.
In Brown Hotel v

Levitt,3 7 decided in 1948, the Court of

Appeals recogmzed the principle that violation of an ordinance
may be negligence per se but denied recovery on the ground
that the infraction of the ordinance was not the proximate cause
of the injury The litigation arose as a result of an injury
" 277 Ky. 8, 125 S.W 2d 763 (1939).
" 286 Ky. 191, 150 S.W 2d 14 (1940)
•302 Ky. 633, 195 S.W 2d 277 (1946).
20 R. C. L. 43.
"302 Ky 633, 635, 195 S.W. 2d 277, 279 (1946)
Ibid.
"306 Ky. 804-, 209 S.W 2d 70 (1948)'.
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suffered by a guest in a fall that occurred while descending the
stairway of the defendant hotel, when struck from behind by an
unidentified man. The stairway, although eleven feet wide, did
not have an intermediate handrail, required by an ordinance of
the City of Louisville, on such stairways of more than seven feet
in width. The plaintiff, asserting that the violation of the ordinance was negligence as a matter of law, recovered a judgment
in the trial court. While the Court of Appeals agreed that the
violation of the ordinance was negligence per se, they reversed
the trial court and held that the defendant was entitled to a per
emptory instruction. The Court declared
"But we can agree with appellant in that the
particular thing that happened here was most likely not
within the zone of apprehension of the ordinance.
In
the light of the evidence can it reasonably be inferred
that even though railings had been placed as provided by
the ordinance, the plaintiff below could have averted or
avoided the injury She and her husband were descending
the steps side by side and about one foot apart. She said
that she grabbed at something and if there had been a
railing there she could have taken hold of it. The fact is
she didn't even take hold of the arm of her husband so
sudden and unexpected was the fall of the man behind her
To permit a recovery herein would be allowing recovery almost, if not quite entirely upon speculation."'
It is submitted that the court erred in ruling as a matter
of law that the failure of'the hotel to maintain a guard rail was
not the proximate cause of the injury Was not the plaintiff, a
business guest of the hotel, a member of the class of persons the
ordihance was designed to protect against injury2 Was not the
danger apprehended by the city legislative 'body in enacting
the ordinance, the risk of falling on the stairs 9 Did not the
injury occur as a result of a member of the protected class, an
invitee, falling on the stairs 9 Is it more unlikely or foreign to
human experiencethat a person will be pushed while descending
stairs than he will fall '
It may be noted that if the handrail had been erected as required by the ordinance, three plausible possibilities come to
mind. The first of these is that the plaintiff might have held the
rail while descending the stairs. If the stairs had appeared
dangerous, the plaintiff would have been contributorily negligent
as a matter of law if she had failed to have held the handrail. 3 9
. 306 Ky 804, 807, 209 S.W 2d 70, 72 (1948).
'Seelbach, Inc. v Mellman, 293 Ky. 790, 170 S.W 2d 18 (J943).
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The second possibility is that the plaintiff might have been able
to have grabbed the handrail had it been there, thus bNaking her
fall. The fact that she was unable to grasp her husband is not
at all conclusive, for the Tails would have been stationary while
her husband was moving, and there would have been rails on
each side while she could grasp her husband only if she fell in
that direction. The tlrd possibility is that the rail miglht have
prevented the falling stranger from striking the plaintiff.
If the purpose of the ordinance was to prevent risk of injury
to guests, caused by their falling through pushing, slipping or
tripping on unguarded stairs, should not the jurv determine if
harm occurred to the plaintiff because the defendant did not
provide the safeguards which the city legislative body believed to
be necessary 9 The court apparently confused this ease with those
where the harm is caused by an unexpected source such as an
object falling on the plaintiff froni above, and the injury sustained has no relation to the violation of safety legislation.
Although it is suggested that Brown Hotel v Levitt was icorrectly decided, the error was only in the application of accepted principles. The case did not purport to make any changes
in the law The court repeated the correct formula but arrived
at a questionable answer. A few weeks later a decision was
handed down in Greyhound Bus Terminal of Louisville v
Thomas 40 which involved a violation of the same ordinance. The
plaintiff while descending the defendant's stairs caught her heel
in some unexplained manner and fell to the floor. The case was
tried on the theory that the defendant was guilty of negligence
per se, and the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the lower court.
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared
"There can be no doubt that the purpose of the ordinance is
to prevent persons descending or ascending a stairway from
falling thereon. 4i In this instance the violation of the ordinance
was held to be the proximate cause of the injury, the reviewing
court accepting without question the plaintiff's testimony that
she grabbed for a nonexistent handrail to break her fall. Since
counsel for the appellant had probably submitted briefs prior
to the decision in the Levitt case, the Court was not called upon
to distinguish the two cases, and did not do so. The construe,o307 Ky. 44, 209 S.W 2d 478 (1948).
-207 KV.44. 46. 209 S.W 2d 478, 479 (1948)
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tion of the ordinance in the Greyhound Bus Term'inal Case is
more consistent with the policy of the Court with regard to the
42
interpretation of safety legislation, announced in former cases.
The Levitt case also treats the question of proximate cause m a
more satisfactory manner. It is submitted that if the injury
complained of occurred to a member of the protected class, in
a manner and by a means that the ordinance was designed to
43
eliminate, the violation is necessarily the proximate cause.
CONCLUSION

A line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals m the latter
part of the ninteenth century and the early part of the twentieth
held that a violation of a city ordinance was neither negligence
nor evidence of negligence. However, the earlier cases have been
impliedly, although not expressly, overruled, and it is the settled
law in this jurisdiction that in a proper case violation of a city
ordinance is negligence per se. The injured party must be a
member of a class for whose benefit the ordinance was enacted,
the injury must be of the type the statute was designed to prevent, and the violation of the ordinance must be the proximate
cause of the injury Contributory negligence is a bar to the
plaintiff's action. In conclusion it is to be observed that if the
ordinance is enacted for the benefit of the public generally, its
44
infraction is not negligence per se.

2
43

See note 27 supra.
See note 35 supra.

The Kentucky Courts apparently have not considered the question of whether or not the defendant's violation of an ordinance may
be excused. For the law generally regarding this question see,
Restatement, Torts sec. 286 Comment c
PROSSER, ToRTS 271 (1941)
44

(1934).

